Safely generating Bitcoin paper wallets

Safely generating Bitcoin paper wallets

I'm new to Bitcoin and I have recently purchased a few fractions of Bitcoin. My BTC are stored on what I understand is an online wallet (a website where I log in using two-factor authentication and where I can buy/sell BTC as well as send/receive BTC). The problem is that my BTC are stored online, which means that they could be potentially exposed to threats like hackers, viruses, technical problems, the website going down, fraud, etc. So, after having searched for other options, I decided that the most secure way of storing BTC would be on a paper wallet.

Creating a paper wallet at bitaddress.org doesn't seem to be that difficult, but of course one has to be sure that the public and private keys are being generated in a completely safe, malware-free environment. Many advanced users employ what are to me very complicated techniques for generating such keys, such as booting the operating system from a pendrive, using Ubuntu, Tails and many other programs and procedures I'm not at all familiar with. Other users just make sure the computer is clean, go to bitaddress.org and then turn off the internet connection before generating the keys. Others save bitaddress.org as an html file and then open that file offline to generate the keys, while others download a copy of bitaddress.org from github and open that copy offline to generate the keys.

Even after having read about BTC, the BTC world is still very complicated to me, so here come the questions:

1) What if I restore my wifi router to factory settings and set it up with a new wifi password and then buy a new computer, access the internet through wifi just for a few seconds just to go to bitaddress.org (and no other web) and then go offline to generate the keys? Would this be a completely safe environment to generate the keys? I can't think of anything cleaner than a recently bought computer. How could I make sure no sensitive information about the keys gets stored anywhere on the computer or web browser after having generated them? This is important because I'm planning to then use my computer for daily work, so I will generate many different wallets at once and then probably never use the same computer again to generate more wallets.

I have read somewhere that one can download a copy of bitaddress.org to a pendrive and then open that website on a computer that "has never touched the internet", but I think that opening bitaddress.org online for a few seconds on a recently bought computer should be a more secure way.

Also, would it be a good idea to connect my computer to the internet by using my cell phone as a router, that is to to say, by using the cell phone's cellular data connection instead of wifi? I think a cell phone's connection to the cellular network should be more difficult to hack than a wifi connection, but anyway cell phones may also have viruses, so I'm not 100% sure what I should do.

2) Why is it that some people prefer not to choose the first generated pair of keys (at bitaddress.org) but instead generate further pairs to choose from?

3) bitaddress.org generates a public key and a private key. Is this public key the same as the BTC address?

4) What are the differences between the different types of wallets offered at bitaddress.org?

5) How can I make sure I'm accessing a legitimate version of bitaddress.org. In other words, how can I make sure no hacker has modified something at bitaddress.org in order to be able to capture generated keys? (I have read somewhere something about computing the "hash" or something like that.)

6) Is there a limit to the number of BTC I can send to/store in a particular address? Can one send any fraction of BTC to a particular address?

Thanks in advance!!

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